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Nevill: Multiple Uses and Conflicting Rights Symposium - Selected Topics
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GUY L. NEVILL*
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INTRODUCTION

The energy crisis has caused unprecedented drilling activity
throughout the United States. According to the Denver based Petroleum Information Corporation, during the first six months of
* Originally published in the Advanced Oil, Gas & Mineral Law Course Book, STATE
OF TEXAS (1981). Reprinted with permission.
** Senior Staff Counsel, Dow Chemical Co., Houston, Texas. Present Past Chairman of
the Oil, Gas and Mineral Law Section of the State Bar of Texas.
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1981, oil and gas drilling activity in the United States increased by
21% over the same period of 1980. Texas was the leading state with
10,932 wells completed during this six-month period. On August 26,
1981, Hughes Tool Company reported to the International Association of Drilling Contractors that 4,151 rotary rigs worked during
that week and that 1,422 of these rigs were in Texas. The energy
crisis has likewise led to increased interest in other fossil fuels,
such as coal and lignite. The Director of the Surface Mining and
Reclamation Division of the Railroad Commission of Texas, J.
Randel Hill, reports that twelve coal and lignite mines were operating in Texas on July 30, 1981. Texas Utilities Generating Company operates five of these lignite mines in Freestone, Panola,
Hopkins and Titus Counties; Alcoa operates a lignite mine in Milam County; Texas Municipal Power Agency operates a lignite
mine in Grimes County; San Miguel Electric Co-op operates a lignite mine in Atascosa County; ICI Americas operates a lignite mine
in Harrison County; Farco Mining Company operates a lignite
mine in Webb County; Texas Industries operates a lignite mine in
Erath County; and Amistad Fuel Company operates a lignite mine
in Coleman County. Thirteen lignite-fueled power units are now in
opertion in Texas: two at Big Brown, three at Martin Lake, three
at Monticello, four at Sandow, and one at San Miguel. An additional nineteen lignite-fueled power units are scheduled for operation by the mid 1990's.
This increased reliance on lignite and other near surface minerals, however, will not be without its costs. During 1980 alone, lignite and coal mining disturbed 2,500 acres and uranium mining
700 acres. There are an estimated ten to twenty billion tons of
near-surface lignite in Texas. If fifty percent of this lignite is eventually recovered by mining at the current rate of 12,000 tons per
year, some 400,000 to 800,000 acres of land will be affected.
Surface mining is a procedure whereby lignite is exposed to the
sky by removing, or stripping, overburden prior to mining. In
Texas, stripping of overburden is generally performed by draglines
which remove up to 100 cubic yards of material per cycle. Subsequently, the coal is mined by shovels and removed from the pit by
trucks. After mining, the pit is filled with waste material, or spoil,
which is removed from the next cut and the land is reclaimed in
accordance with the Texas Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation
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Act.' The mining process is completely surface destructive and the
time from whence stripping commences to reclamation is five to
seven years.
During a typical five-year lignite permit, a mine producing
5,500,000 tons per year will pass over some 3,000 acres. Lignite is
found in beds that usually dip 70 to 80 feet per mile away from
their intersection with the surface, or outcrop. Mining commences
along the outcrop, where it is necessary to remove about twenty
feet of soil and oxidized lignite in order to reach high quality lignite. A typical mine will follow the outcrop for thousands of feet,
moving back and forth as the lignite is followed downdip. For a
10,000-foot long pit, 3,000 acres will be destroyed when the mine
reaches a depth of 200 feet. The surface mining techniques presently in use in Texas, moreover, require complete control of the
entire surface above each mine, a minimum of 5,000 to 20,000
acres. This is in stark contrast to the drilling of oil and gas wells in
the oil patch where only a few acres of land are required for each
well.
Within the next thirty to forty years, approximately 400,000 to
800,000 acres of land in Texas will be surface mined solely for lignite; likewise, many thousands of additional acres will be mined for
other substances. Surface mining will inevitably lead to many conflicts between the owners of oil and gas interests and the owners of
near-surface mineral interests who desire to conduct surface mining operations since uranium and lignite are frequently located on
structures that also contain oil and gas reservoirs. With all the
drilling and surface mining activity now in progress, it seems appropriate to examine the law concerning multiple uses of the surface estate and the conflicting rights that arise out of these uses.
This article addresses (1) the conflicting rights of the owners of the
severed mineral and surface estates; (2) conflicts between mineral
lessees and surface tenants; (3) the conflicting rights of surface
owners and owners of private pipeline interests; and (4) conflicts
arising between an oil and gas lessee and a lignite or uranium
lessee who desires to mine its near surface minerals by reasonable,
but surface destructive methods. Some statutes and regulations of
administrative bodies concerning such conflicts will be mentioned,
but are beyond the scope of this article. An effort will also be made
1. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5920-11 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
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to establish the trend of the Texas courts in connection with these
problems, and to offer possible solutions to problems that have not
yet reached the Texas appellate courts.
II.

CONFLICTING RIGHTS BETWEEN THE OWNERS OF SEVERED
MINERAL AND SURFACE ESTATES

Conflicting rights resulting from multiple uses of a single tract of
land essentially arise from the severance of either the mineral or
surface estate. Severance is effected by grant 2 or reservation 3 in a
deed, or by lease of either the mineral or surface estate." When
severance is by deed, the owner of the mineral estate and the owner of the surface estate each possess all of the usual incidents and
attributes of an estate in land.5 As the Supreme Court of Texas
observed in Acker v. Guinn,' "A grant or reservation of minerals
by the fee owner effects a horizontal severance and the creation of
two separate and distinct estates, an estate in the surface and an
'7
estate in the minerals.

Of course, a mere grant or reservation of minerals does not convey or reserve any title to the surface. 8 As a necessary appurtenance to the mineral estate, however, a grant or reservation of
minerals carries with it the right to use so much of the surface as
may be reasonably necessary to enjoy the estate and enforce the
rights of its owner.9 Otherwise, a grant or reservation of minerals
2. See Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 167, 254 S.W. 290,
292 (1923); Perkins v. Kent, 274 S.W.2d 892, 894 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1954, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
3. See Stradley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 155 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1941, writ ref'd).
4. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. L. & G. Oil Co., 259 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stradley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 155 S.W.2d 649,
651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1941, writ refd). Severance may also occur by operation of
law, as by sale under judgment or court decree. See Yates v. Gulf Oil Corp., 182 F.2d 286,
290 (5th Cir. 1950) (applying Texas law).
5. See Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 99, 176 S.W.2d 302, 305 (1943).
6. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
7. Id. at 352.
8. See Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 99, 176 S.W.2d 302, 305 (1943).
9. If not expressly provided, "reasonably necessary" use of the surface by the mineral
owner will be implied. See, e.g., Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 99, 176 S.W.2d 302, 305
(1943); Getty Oil Co. v. Royal, 422 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1967, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Eternal Cemetery Corp. v. Tammen, 324 S.W.2d 562, 564 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But cf. Texaco, Inc. v. Faris, 413 S.W.2d 147, 149-50 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (when lease expressly provides scope of surface
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would be wholly worthless since the grantee could not enter the
land."0
Although the mineral estate is dominant, and although its owner
may use as much of the leased premises as is reasonably necessary
to develop his estate,"1 the rights of the mineral owner must be
exercised with due regard to the rights of the surface owner."'
When a difference of opinion arises between the owners of the
mineral and surface estates, the question of reasonable use of the
surface is generally considered a question of fact for the jury,"3
while the proper effect to be given the grant of the oil and gas lease
and the proper legal definition of "reasonably necessary" are determined by the court.1 4 The surface owner, however, is not required
to prove that the mineral owner's use of the surface deviates from
industry custom. Rather, he need only show that the particular use
made of the surface is not reasonably necessary.
Reasonable use of the surface by the mineral owner, moreover,
may require the mineral owner to employ an alternate means of
production when his proposed means of production will impair or
preclude a prior existing use of the surface by the surface owner. In
Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 5 for example, the surface owner brought
suit to enjoin Getty from erecting and maintaining pumping units
at heights which interfered with a system of rotating irrigation
pipes which he had previously installed. The trial court granted
Getty's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, but the court
of civil appeals reversed.' 6 Affirming the judgment of the intermediate court, the supreme court observed that
use court should not apply reasonably necessary standard).
10. See, e.g., Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 99, 176 S.W.2d 302, 305 (1943); Texaco, Inc.
v. Faris, 413 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stanolind Oil
& Gas Co. v. Wimberly, 181 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1944, no writ).
11. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. 1967).
12. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex. 1972); Getty Oil Co. v.
Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133,
134 (Tex. 1967).
13. Keeton & Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 38 TEXAs L. REv. 1,
4 (1956).
14. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133, 135 (Tex. 1967); Keeton &
Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 TEXAs L. REv. 1, 4 (1956).
15. 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
16. See Jones v. Getty Oil Co., 458 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970),
afl'd, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
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[the mineral estate] owner is entitled to make reasonable use of the
surface for the production of his minerals. It is not ordinarily contemplated, however, that the utility of the surface will be destroyed
or substantially impaired. The due regard concept defines, more
fully what is to be considered in the determination of whether a surface use by the lessee is reasonably necessary. There may be only
one manner of use of the surface whereby the minerals can be produced. The lessee has the right to pursue this use, regardless of surface damage. . .. And there may be necessitous temporary use governed by the same principle but under the circumstances indicated
here; i.e., where there is an existing use by the surface owner which
would otherwise be precluded or impaired, and where under the established practices in the industry there are alternatives available to
the lessee whereby the minerals can be recovered, the rules of reasonable usage of the surface may require the adoption of an alterna-

tive by the lessee.17

On rehearing the court clarified its former opinion, stating that if
the use selected by the dominant mineral lessee is the only reasonable, usual and customary method available for developing and
producing the minerals on particular lands, the owner of the servient estate must yield. 18 If, however, there are other usual, customary and reasonable methods practiced in the industry which would
not interfere with the existing use of the surface by a servient surface owner, it may be unreasonable for the mineral owner to employ an interfering method. 19 These considerations involve questions to be resolved by the trier of fact.
0 the concepts
In Sun Oil Company v. Whitaker"
of "due regard," "existing use," and "alternative means" were again before
the supreme court. Sun, a prior oil and gas lessee, proposed to use
fresh subterranian water in its water flood operation when the surface owner had been using the same water for irrigation prior to
Sun's proposed use. Sun sought to enjoin Whitaker, the surface
owner, from interfering with Sun's production of water from the
common reservoir. Whitaker cross-acted, seeking an injunction
prohibiting Sun from producing and using the water for its secon-

17. Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971) (quoting Acker v. Guinn,
464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971)).
18. See id. at 628.
19. Id. at 628.
20. 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972).
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dary recovery operations. Whitaker further sought damages for
Sun's production of water up to the time of trial. The lease agreement between Sun and its grantor provided that Sun should have
free use of "water from said land except water from [grantor's]
wells for all operations" conducted under the lease.2 The parties,
moreover, stipulated that Sun's waterflood process was a reasonable and proper operation.2 2
On motion for rehearing, the court withdrew its initial opinion
and rendered judgment that Whitaker be enjoined from interfering
with Sun's operations. Conceding that water is part of the surface
estate unless expressly severed by conveyance or reservation, 3 the
court stressed the express provision in Sun's lease allowing Sun the
free use of water under the land.2 The court thus held that Sun's
implied right of reasonable use of the surface included the right to
use as much water as was reasonably necessary to conduct its
operations.25
The court's opinion in Whitaker, however, does not mean that
the mineral owner's implied right will always include the right to
the free use of the surface estate's water. The exceptional circumstances presented in the case compel this conclusion. In the first
place, Sun was expressly granted the right to the free use of water.
Secondly, and more important, Whitaker had stipulated that Sun's
waterflood operation was a reasonable means of production. Finally, it was established at trial that efforts to use saltwater had
failed and that the subterranian reservoir was the only available
source of useable water on the Whitaker tract.2 The court, therefore, distinguished its prior holding in Getty Oil, limiting that
opinion to "situations in which there are reasonable alternative
methods that may be employed by the lessee on the leased prem-

21. Id. at 810 (emphasis by the court).
22. Id. at 810.
23. See id. at 811. Unless expressly severed, freshwater is part of the surface estate. See
id. at 811 (citing Fleming Found. v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). In Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865 (Tex.
1973), decided two years after Whitaker, the court held that saltwater is likewise a part of
the surface estate unless expressly severed. See id. at 867.
24. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex. 1971).
25. See id. at 812.
26. Although there were other available sources of water on adjacent tracts, the court
observed that to require Sun to purchase water off the leased premises "would be in derogation of [its] dominant estate." Id. at 812.
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That the rights of the mineral owner vis-a-vis the surface owner
are not absolute is illustrated by the court's subsequent opinion in

Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. West.28 The Wests, owners of a roy-

alty interest, sought to enjoin Humble, the owner of the mineral
fee and surface estate, from injecting extraneous gas into the reservoir for storage purposes. Humble had previously produced 80% of
the recoverable gas in the field, and production of the remaining
20% would have destroyed the reservoir's storage capacity. Humble, moreover, owned the reservoir structure in fee simple as an
incident of its ownership of the surface estate.29 The Wests, however, contended that Humble's storage of gas would deprive them
of their absolute right to the royalty in the unproduced gas remaining in the reservoir. The court rejected this argument and reaffirmed its prior holdings requiring a reasonable accomodation of
the competing rights of the. surface and mineral owners." Noting
that the rights of the dominant mineral estate are not absolute, the
court stated that the factual context presented- and not the nature of the interests-is the determinative factor in any particular
case."'
III.

SURFACE OWNER'S CONFLICTING RIGHTS

It is generally accepted that the rights of a surface tenant holding under a prior lease for grazing purposes or agricultural use are
superior to the rights of a subsequent oil and gas lessee, at least
until the expiration of the surface lease. 8 2 There is little Texas authority to be found on the subject," but in Republic Natural Gas
Company v. Melson, 4 the Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted this
27. Id. at 812 (emphasis by the court).
28. 508 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1974).
29. See id. at 815.
30. See id. at 816 ("under these circumstances, the accepted principles of accomodation
that have ruled the resolution of like conflicts are determinative").
31. See id. at 815.
32. See Robinson Drilling Co. v. Moses, 256 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tex, Civ. App.-Eastland
1953, no writ). See generally McMahon, Rights And Liabilities With Respect To Surface
Usage By Mineral Lessees, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION 6TH INST. ON OIL & GAS LAW & TAX.

231, 236-37 (1955).
33. See Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Wimberly, 181 S.W.2d 942, 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1944, no writ) (lease for "grazing purposes only").
34. 274 P.2d 543 (Okla. 1954).
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view. 5 Even when the surface lease is prior, however, the surface
tenant cannot exclude the mineral lessee from the leased premises
altogether. "6 If the interest of the surface lessee is junior in time to
the prior mineral grantee or oil and gas lessee, the mineral owner is
not required to obtain permission from the surface lessee to enter
the premises," and may use as much of the surface as is reasonably necessary for exploration and production purposes.3 8 The oil
and gas lessee whose lease is junior to any surface lease, however,
must first examine the terms of the surface lease to determine
whether it affects his rights as the owner of the dominant mineral
estate. The junior oil and gas lessee must also determine whether
the prior surface lease also operates as a severance of the surface
from the mineral estate. If it does, surface easements in favor of
the owner of the reserved mineral estate will be implied absent an
express provision to the contrary.3
When the surface lease grants "the surface only" there is clearly
a severance of the surface from the mineral estate and the owner of
the reserved mineral estate retains the usual surface easements
that entitle him to recover the minerals.4 0 Thus, a subsequent oil
and gas lease executed by the owner of the mineral fee also conveys these same surface easements, and the oil and gas lessee can
enter the premises without the consent of the surface owner.'
When the surface is held for a term of years under an "agricultural lease," however, the oil and gas lessee may be required to
obtain the consent of the surface lessee before entering the prem-

35. See id. at 544.
36. See Ball v. Dillard, 602 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. 1980); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v.
Wimberly, 181 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1944, no writ).
37. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Whitaker, 257 F.2d 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1958) (applying Texas
law); Sinclair Prarie Oil Co. v. Perry, 191 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1945,
no writ).
38. See Chapapas v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 323 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Generally, the mineral lessee is not liable for surface damage
in the absence of negligence unless the lessee's use of the surface was more than reasonably
necessary. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Whitaker, 257 F.2d 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1958); Humble Oil &
Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133, 134-35 (Tex. 1967).
39. See 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 218.3, at 192-94.
40. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586, 592 (5th Cir. 1957) (applying
Texas law). See generally Davis, Selected Problems Regarding Lessee's Rights And Obligations To The Surface Owner, ROCKY MT. 8TH ANN. MINERAL LAW INST. 315, 321-25 (1963).
41. See Kemmerer v. Midland Oil & Drilling Co., 229 F. 872, 873 (8th Cir. 1915).
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ises.' 2 This situation is perhaps distinguishable from an express
severance of the mineral estate, or a grant or lease of "the surface
only.

' 43

The surface lessee for a term of years is entitled to enforce

his covenant of peaceful and quiet enjoyment and should be entitled to damages when the covenant is breached." Absent a prior
severance of the mineral estate, the possessory right to the entire
fee is in the surface tenant, and a subsequent mineral lease does
not pass any possessory right in the land.45 Logically, the oil and
gas lessee should have to acquire a like lease or ratification from
the tenant for years. Otherwise, the surface tenant's right to quiet
enjoyment is rendered meaningless.46
IV.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN SURFACE OWNERS AND OWNERS OF
PRIVATE PIPELINE EASEMENTS

The granting clause in the oil and gas lease usually expressly
grants the right to lay pipelines. This right, however, is limited to
laying pipelines that serve the leased property. 47 When the landowner grants a right of way to a gas pipeline company and the
instrument is silent as to the exact location of the pipeline, the
grantee may locate, construct, maintain and operate its line at any
42. See 1 H.

WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 218.3, at 195 (1981).
43. See Keeton & Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 TEXAS L.
REV. 1, 5 (1959). When a prior express or clear severance occurs, however, the oil and gas
lessee, although junior in time to the surface lessee, can still make reasonable use of the
surface for production operations, see Robinson Drilling Co. v. Moses, 256 S.W.2d 650, 652
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1953, no writ), and the surface lessee may not interfere with
necessary surface operations of a subsequent mineral lessee. See Hagar v. Martin, 277
S.W.2d 195, 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44. See 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 218.3, at 199-200 (1981). The
surface lessee, however, should not be able to "veto" oil and gas development by obtaining
an injunction especially when drainage to adjacent tracts is threatened. See id. § 218.3, at
197.
45. R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 5.5, at 193 (1971); see Kemmerer v.
Midland Oil & Drilling Co., 229 F. 872, 877 (8th Cir. 1915) (Sanborn, J., dissenting). The
determination of whether a subsequent oil and gas lessee has any possessory rights in the
surface, however, may depend upon the intent of the parties and extrinsic circumstances.
See 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 218.3, at 198 (1981).
46. See R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 5.5, at 193 (1971); 1 H. WILLIAMS &
C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 218,3, at 197 (1981).
47. See Miller v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 309 S.W.2d 876, 878-79 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1958, no writ) (right extended to adjacent lands in unit when lease pooled);
Comment, Land Uses Permitted On Oil and Gas Lessee, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 889, 896 (1959).
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location across the land covered by the grant.4 8 Similarly, when the
instrument does not specify the width of the pipeline right of way,
the grant is not ambiguous and parole evidence is not admissible to
establish the width of the right of way granted. 4 9 Every pipeline
right of way, moreover, carries with it the right to do such things
as are reasonably necessary for the full enjoyment of the easement,
but the exercise of the right is confined to a manner that does not
injuriously increase the burden on the servient surface estate.
Problems can-and do-arise when the instrument grants multiple pipeline privileges or permits the grantee to change the size
and location of the easement. When the grant clearly states that
the grantee has the right to construct a pipeline in excess of the
one actually used, this right will continue to exist notwithstanding
the exercise of a lesser privilege.5 0 Conversly, when a pipeline easement is general as to its location as well as its size, the easement
becomes fixed and certain after the pipeline is laid and used with
acquiescence of both grantor and grantee.5 ' The right to lay additional pipeline is not a mere equitable right, but grants a presently
vested interest in land.2 Consequently, it is not violative of the
rule against perpetuities as an option uncertain to vest,53 and cannot be abandoned by the "mere passage of time alone."'14 Instead,
an affirmative intent to abandon is required.5 5 Finally, the pipeline
easement is an interest in land in the constitutional sense, and its
owner is entitled to compensation for any damage thereto caused

48. See Lone Star Gas Co. v. Childress, 187 S.W.2d 936, 940 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1945, no writ) (grantee is entitled to use as much of land as each occasion may reasonably
demand).
49. Crawford v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 250 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1952, writ ref'd).
50. See Knox v. Pioneer Natural Gas Co., 321 S.W.2d 596, 600-01 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
51. Houston Pipe Line Co. v. Dwyer, 374 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. 1964).
52. Strauch v. Coastal States Crude Gathering Co., 424 S.W.2d 677, 681 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1968, writ dism'd); Williams v. Humble Pipe Line Co., 417 S.W.2d
453, 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1967, no writ). The right to lay additional pipe line is an
expansible easement. Strauch v. Coastal States Crude Gathering Co., 424 S.W.2d 677, 681
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, writ dism'd).
53. Williams v. Humble Pipe Line Co., 417 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1967, no writ).
54. Stauch v. Coastal States Crude Gathering Co., 424 S.W.2d 677, 681 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1968, writ dism'd).
55. Id. at 683.
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by the state. 6
Usually a pipeline right of way requires the grantee to bury his
pipeline below plow depth when his grantor requests him to do so.
Since the depth at which the grantee should bury pipelines varies
depending on the agricultural use being made of the surface, he
must determine this depth either at the time of the execution or
the time of performance. In Mapco v. Ratliff,"7 for example, the
depth of the pipeline was continually reduced by shifting sand.
The court, however, held that the owner of the easement had a
continuing duty to maintain the pipeline below the depth required
since deep plowing was practiced at the time of
for deep plowing
58
the grant.
Texas recordation laws59 apply to easements created by express
grant, and a duly recorded pipeline easement constitutes constructive notice to tranferees of the grantor.6 0 In this situation, the
transferee of the servient estate is not an innocent purchaser."
Similarly, when two pipeline easements are created by a single
grantor over the same tract of land, and the first easement is recorded prior to the second, the owner of the second pipeline easement is charged with notice of the first easement owner's right to
possession of the surface as described in the instrument creating
the prior right of way. 2 If the owner of the first easement requires
all of the surface described in his easement and use of the entire
surface is reasonably necessary for the full enjoyment of the easement, the owner of the prior easement may exclude the junior
pipeline right of way owner from the same tract. The owner of the
prior easement, however, is superior only to the extent exclusion is
reasonably necessary for his use of the same tract. When there is a
dispute between two competing pipeline easement owners in the
same tract of land, it is important to examine closely the rights

56. See Magnolia Pipe Line Co. v. City of Tyler, 348 S.W.2d 537, 541 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1961, writ refd).
57. 528 S.W.2d 622, 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
58. See id. at 624.
59. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 6626 (Vernon Supp. 1982), 6646 (Vernon 1969).
60. Cf. Clements v. Taylor, 184 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1944, no
writ) (recorded easement is constructive notice under article 6646).
61. Cf. Latimer v. Hess, 183 S.W.2d 996, 997 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1944, writ
ref'd) (easement in alley created by express grant; subsequent purchaser not innocent).
62. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6646 (Vernon 1969). See generally 4 F. LANGE, LAND
TITLES AND TITLE EXAMINATION

§ 371, at 130 (Texas Practice 1961).
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granted in each instrument. Words expressing the right to use the
land such as "exclusive right," "exclusive and unobstructed," and
"exclusive and superior" can create an expanded use of the pipeline easement when employed properly.
V.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN AN OIL AND GAS LESSEE AND AN IRON

ORE, COAL AND LIGNITE, OR URANIUM LESSEE: WHOSE RIGHTS ARE
SUPERIOR?

As the introduction to this article notes, there has been a tremendous increase in recovery of coal and lignite in Texas through
surface mining operations. Such surface mining operations require
use of 100% of the surface area during the five to seven year period
when actual mining and reclamation operations are taking place.
In addition, most of the same land often contains prospective
sources of oil and gas. Both lessees have dominant mineral estates,
meaning that these two methods of mineral development will inevitably conflict. At present, no case involving a dispute between a
near surface mineral lessee and an oil and gas lessee has reached
the Texas appellate courts.6 8 What will happen when an oil and gas
lessee moves a rig on location to drill an exploratory well to a
depth of 15,000 to 20,000 feet, which may cost between one million
and six million dollars depending on the depth of the formation,
and he discovers a coal and lignite lessee who has completed exploratory wells cubicating the tonnage of near surface minerals?
After carefully considering the holdings in Getty Oil Company v.
Jones and Sun Oil Company v. Whitaker, it is apparent that the
concepts of "prior existing use" and "alternative means" were developed to settle disputes between the mineral estate and the surface estate, one estate being dominant and the other servient. The
holdings in these cases restricted the rights of the dominant min63. In Roach v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 574 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ), Chevron, a surface mining lessee, instituted suit against Roach, a oil and gas
lessee, seeking declatory and injunctive relief. Chevron, whose strip mining operations for
uranium were approaching a well being reworked by Roach, claimed superior right to the
tract occupied by Roach as necessary for its mining operations. Chevron based ints claim on
the priority in time of its lease. Roach filed a plea of privilege, which was contested by
Chevron and overruled by the trial court. The trial court's action overruling the plea of
privilege was affirmed on appeal. The only holding of the case is that venue was proper in
the county in which the land was located. The question of superior right to the use of the
surface was not reached. See id. at 204.
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eral owner in disputes between an oil and gas lessee and the owner
of the servient surface estate. The concepts developed in these
cases, therefore, should not control disputes between two lessees,
each of which hold a lease on a dominant mineral estate. The
modern near surface lease form, moreover, grants the lessee an express right to destroy the surface of the tract of land involved. By
comparison, the mineral owners in Getty Oil Company v. Jones
and Sun Oil Company v. Whitaker were relying only on an implied grant to use as much of the surface as was reasonably necessary in producing oil. Once the question of superior right to the use
of the surface is firmly established, however, there should be no
hesitation on the part of our appellate courts to extend the concepts of Getty Oil Company v. Jones and Sun Oil Company v.
Whitaker to encompass conflicts between oil and gas and near surface mineral lessees.
The function of the courts speaking through its judges should be
to formulate a rule of law consistent with the public policy of promoting the development of all the state's natural resources, particularly those providing a source of energy which is sorely needed in
both the State of Texas and nationally. When the appellate court
finds itself in this position, it must formulate a rule that leaves no
room for reasonable doubt as to which of these important natural
resources, both being a part of the dominant mineral estate, has
the superior right. In my opinion, priority in time should determine superiority of right. A rule based on priority is both workable
and fair. The following sections of this article illustrate how such a
rule would be applied.
A. When The Lessor of The Near Surface Mineral Lessee Acquired His Interest As Grantee of The Fee Simple Estate
When a severance of the mineral estate occurs, the owner of the
determinable fee in the mineral estate also acquires a right to use
so much of the surface as is reasonably necessary to produce the
mineral conveyed. This right arises by express provision, as in the
case of the prior near surface mineral lease, or is implied as a matter of law. When both of the dominant mineral estates are derived
from a common grantor, if the prior near surface mineral lease was
duly recorded, it will be found in the junior oil and gas lessee's
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chain of title. 4 The junior oil and gas lessee, therefore, will be
charged with notice of the prior near surface mineral lease and the
lessee's express right to exclusive possession of the surface for the
purpose of conducting surface destructive mining operations. 6
Conversely, the rights of a prior oil and gas lessee under the same
circumstances should be essentially the same as those of the prior
near surface mineral lessee. The fact that the prior oil and gas
lessee will have more latitude with respect to the location of his
wells and related production equipment, and the fact that the near
surface mineral lessee has been granted the express right to conduct surface destructive mining operations, however, should be justification for the appellate courts to extend under the concept of
"alternative means" in favor of the near surface mineral lessee certain circumstances.
In the event the prior near surface mineral lessee fails to record
his lease prior to the execution of the junior oil and gas lease, the
question is whether the oil and gas lessee has actual notice of the
prior near surface mineral lease. For example, if the prior near surface mineral lessee has entered the land and commenced operations by drilling exploratory and development wells, as is customarily done, the junior oil and gas lessee is on actual notice of the
prior near surface mineral lease. Similarly, a permit to conduct
surface mining operation which includes the tract in question in its
mine plan may be hown by the local deed records."

64. See TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 6626, 6627 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
65. See id. art. 6646 (Vernon 1969).
66. Under the Texas Surface Coal Mining And Reclamation Act, TEx. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 5920-11 (Vernon Sulp. 1982), the applicant for a surface mining permit must file a
copy of its application with the clerk of the county in which the land is located. See id. art.
5920-11, § 17(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982). At the same time, the applicant must place an advertisement in "a local newspaper of general circulation," detailing the ownership, location, and
boundaries of the affected land. See id. art. 5920-11, § 20(a). Similarly, under the Texas
Uranium Surface Minining and Reclamation Act, TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 131.001131.270 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1982), the Railroad Commission is required to file a copy of
the application for a surface mining permit with the clerk of the county in which the land is
located. See id. § 131.138 (Vernon 1978).
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B. When The Lessor of The Near Surface Mineral Lessee
Acquired His Interest As Grantor In a Grant Of Oil, Gas And
"Other Minerals" or as Grantee of "The Surface Only"
Under the rule established in Acker v. Guinn,67 Reed v. Wylie
1,68 and Reed v. Wylie 11,6 when the owner of the fee simple title
first severs the minerals by a grant of the "oil, gas and other minerals,

' 70

he retains ownership of the balance of the tract, including

near surface minerals. Assuming that he then executes a near surface mineral lease which is promptly recorded, if the grantee who
acquired the oil, gas and "other minerals" subsequently executes
an oil and gas lease covering his interest in the same tract, does the
priority of the recording of the near surface mineral lease still determine the question of superiority with respect to the junior oil
and gas lease?
The near surface minerals are definitely recognized by the Supreme Court of Texas as minerals; as such, they are part of the
dominant mineral estate. For that reason, the rights that flow to
the owner of the prior recorded near surface mineral lessee should
be the same whether the lessor acquired his title to the near surface minerals as grantee from the owner of the fee simple estate or
as a grantor in a deed conveying the "oil, gas and other minerals"
to another when the near surface mineral ores did not pass to the
grantee. Likewise, the same rights should flow under our registration statute in favor of the owner of a prior recorded near surface
mineral lease when his lessor acquired the near surface minerals in
a grant of the "surface only."
C. When the Lessor of the Near Surface Mineral Lessee Acquired His Interest as Grantee Specifically Named Near Surface
Mineral Such as Iron Ore, Coal and Lignite or Uranium
When the lessor in a near surface
ore, coal and lignite, or uranium in an
would his near surface mineral lessee
junior oil and gas lessee hold superior
67. 464
68. 554
69. 597
70. See
(Tex. 1977);

mineral lease acquired iron
express grant or reservation,
involved in a dispute with a
right under a prior recorded

S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977).
S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (1980); Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 171
Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971).
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799

near surface mineral lease? In my opinion, the near surface mineral lease of the named substance would be superior to the junior
oil and gas lease under our registration laws. The severance of
named mineral substance, however, raises a second legal question.
The attorney representing the junior oil and gas lessee, as well as
the attorney representing the surface owner, would be in a position
to question the right of the near surface mineral lessee to use surface destructive methods in mining unless that method was expressly and affirmatively set forth in the grant or reservation to
his lessor. There is no Texas decision on this precise question as of
this date. In Acker v. Guinn, however, the Supreme Court, did establish a general rule of construction to determine whether iron ore
passed under a grant of oil, gas and other minerals: "The parties to
a mineral lease or deed usually think of the mineral estate as including valuable substances that are removed from the ground by
means of wells or mine shafts. This estate is dominant, of course,
and its owner is entitled to make reasonably use of the surface for
the production of his minerals. It is not ordinarily contemplated,
however, that the utility of the surface . . .will be destroyed or
7' 1
substantially impaired.
The same question has been considered by the courts of a number of other jurisdictions, and various approaches and rules of construction have been used to determine the intention of the parties. 7 2 The holdings of these cases are not uniform, but the
majority rule appears to be that the right to use so much of the
land as may be necessary cannot be interpreted as the right to destroy the value of the surface of the land. 73 Thus, the cautious attorney representing the near surface mineral lessee should consider
whether the Texas courts will permit his client to mine by surface
destructive methods when the lessee is exercising his rights only
under the implied grant to use as much of the surface as is reasonably necessary.74 If you represent a near surface mineral lessee
under these circumstances, you should consider advising your cli-

71. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (emphasis added).
72. See generally 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 219, at 262.1-262.2
(1981).
73. See, e.g., W.S. Newell, Inc. v. Randall, 373 So.2d 1068, 1070 (Ala. 1979); Southern
Title Ins. Co. v. Oiler, 595 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Ark. 1980); Holland v. Dolese Co., 540 P.2d 549,
551 (Okla. 1975).
74. See Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971).
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ent to obtain the consent of the surface owner prior to proceeding
with mining by surface destructive methods.
D. Remedy: Injunctive Relief Or Damages?
The prior near surface mineral lessee may face difficulty in enjoining the oil and gas lessee from conducting operations on the
same tract of land unless the near surface mineral lessee has obtained his permit to conduct surface mining operations from the
state and filed his mine plan in the local deed records, disclosing
those tracts which he desires to mine by surface mining operations. 7 This is so because the near surface mineral lessee will not
be able to establish immediate irreparable injury unless his mine
plan shows that he will reach the disputed tract in the near future.76 In any event, a near surface mineral lessee's rights would be
superior to the rights of the junior oil and gas lessee, and upon
reaching the point in his mine plan where the junor oil and gas
lease has drilled his oil well, the near surface mineral lessee would
be entitled to recover damages arising out of any obstruction
caused by the well's location. The attorney representing the junior
oil and gas lessee should advise his client that in most cases involving coal and lignite leases such damages could easily run well over
one million dollars.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the near future there will be a tremendous demand for natural resources in general. In many instances, this will undoubtedly
result in numerous conflicts between the owners of various interests in both the surface and mineral estates. Such conflicts are inevitable given the multiple uses to which a single tract of land can
be put. While the Texas courts have developed workable rules for
75. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5920-11, § 17(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
76. See Crawford Energy, Inc. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 541 S.W.2d 463, 467 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1976, no writ). In Crawford, Texas Industries (TXI) sought to enjoin Crawford, a junior oil and gas lessee, from drilling on the same tract of land in which TXI was
quarying rock. The court of civil appeals dissolved a temporary injunction granted by the
trial court, concluding that TXI had not shown "immediate probable injuries justifying the
temporary injunction to protect its interest." Id. at 467 (emphasis by the court).
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resolving many of these disputes, these same courts will be confronted with new problems requiring new solutions. 7

77. As Justice Campbell observed in Dallas Power & Light Co. v. Cleghorn, 623 S.W.2d
310 (Tex. 1981), "Our jurisprudence of hard minerals has not been developed." Id. at 312
(Campbell, J., concurring).
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